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This chapter articulates the idea that, rather than discussing when force is justified 
or how force is authorized, it is time to re-imagine and expand the parameters of 
the prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. In 
returning to the prohibition, I use structural bias feminist approaches to consider 
how the law on the use of force has fared in the first two decades after the advent 
of feminist approaches addressing international law.2 Structural bias feminism 
1 Shelly Wright, International Human Rights, Decolonisation and Globalisation: Becoming Human 
(New York: Routledge Research in International Law, 2001).
2 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelly Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International 
Law’ (1991) 85 American Journal of International Law 379.
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focuses on both organizational and normative structures to demonstrate the gen-
dering of international legal categories and how this contributes to the harm and 
discrimination women experience globally.3 I focus on women’s low participation 
in decision-making structures, the need for an expanded institutional take-up of 
feminist approaches, and the neglect of feminist peace studies in international legal 
scholarship, to draw conclusions about the law on the use of force, in particular the 
prohibition on the use of force. I reflect on when force has been authorized, using 
the Security Council action in Libya in 2011 as an example of the normative and 
organizational exclusion of women, and when force has been justified, in particu-
lar contemporary US justifications for targeted strikes against terrorist actors on 
the territory of another state, to challenge the Council’s contemporary understand-
ing of the relationship between women, peace, and security. I  note the Security 
Council’s women, peace, and security resolutions4 to highlight how the women, 
peace, and security framework supports and legitimates the use of force. This is an 
outcome which I am critical of and recommend a focus on strengthening the pro-
hibition on the use of force instead.
In Section II, I focus on women as participants in decision-making structures, reflect-
ing on the access some women have to the Security Council and the impact the Security 
Council’s resolutions on women, peace, and security have had on country-specific 
resolutions. Using the authorization of force in Libya in 2011, I demonstrate how deci-
sions with respect to the use of force remain untouched by the women, peace, and 
security framework. This raises questions about the organizational and normative 
capacity for women’s participation as an embedded international norm.
In Section III, I  consider the intersection of race and gender privilege in inter-
national law and, drawing on the work of Orford,5 call for the Council’s ongoing work 
on women, peace, and security to respond to the diversity of feminist approaches. 
Recognition of diversity complicates our legal projects and mitigates against a sin-
gle sentence—even if a long one—such as the prohibition on the use of force, in 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, as the only law prohibiting the deployment of mili-
tary force by states. This section recalls, Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright’s claim 
in 1991 that ‘no single approach can deal with the complexity of international organ-
isations, processes or rules or the diversity of women’s experiences’.6 Acknowledging 
the diversity of feminist approaches, and of women’s experiences, challenges the 
3 Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’, 621.
4 The Council has issued five resolutions on women, peace, and security, see: SC Res 1325: UN SCOR 
4213th mtg, S/RES/1325 (31 Oct 2000); SC Res 1820: UN SCOR 5916th mtg, S/RES/1820 (19 June 2008); 
SC Res 1888: UN SCOR 6195th mtg, S/RES/1888 (30 Sept 2009); SC Res 1889: UN SCOR, 6196th mtg, 
S/RES/1889 (5 Oct 2009); SC Res 1960: UN SCOR, 6453 mtg, S/RES/1960 (16 Dec 2010).
5 Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention:  Human Rights and the Use of Force in 
International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003).
6 Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelly Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International 
Law’, 634.
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Security Council’s framework on women, peace, and security which I  describe 
as legitimating the Council rather than representing a feminist understanding of 
security.7 I  use targeted strikes on the territory of other states as an example of 
the type of force that is insufficiently attended to by the Council yet in violation 
of Article 2(4). As the justification for targeted strikes in part rests on the failure 
of states to implement the Council’s targeted sanctions regime,8 attention to the 
risks of the targeted sanctions being implicated in targeted strikes requires further 
attention. Rather than the instigation of new forms of targeted sanctions, such as 
those developed under the 1325 framework against suspected perpetrators of wide-
spread and systematic sexual violence in armed conflict, recalling the prohibition 
on the use of force requires condemnation of targeted strikes. As such, Section III 
demonstrates how the complicity of (some) feminist approaches in legitimating the 
Security Council’s action (and inaction) directly undermines the prohibition on the 
use of force while equally undermining the perceived legitimacy of feminist ana-
lysis in non-Western states.
In Section IV, I turn to feminist peace activism. Feminist peace activism is a per-
sistent yet hidden component of the law on the use of force, recognized as an element 
of the international structure since at least 1915.9 Acknowledging the role of women 
and feminists as organizing for peace, and disarmament, forces us to recognize that 
to speak of war (or force) and not to speak of peace is to begin from a premise that 
ultimately favours rather than restrains military action. This results in the prohib-
ition functioning as a trigger to arguments for justified or authorized force rather 
than as a restraint on the use of force. For feminist approaches, the references to 
the potential to the use of ‘necessary means’ in response to widespread and system-
atic sexual violence in situations before the Council—found in Security Council 
Resolutions 1820, 1888, and 1960—further challenges the Council’s women, peace, 
and security agenda as counterintuitive to the history and the diversity of feminist 
approaches.
In articulating feminist perspectives on the prohibition on the use of force, I dem-
onstrate persistent themes that engage gender, the law on the use of force, and the 
prohibition contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The isolation of traditional 
(or mainstream)10 approaches to the law on the use of force from gender analysis 
7 See also:  Dianne Otto, ‘The Security Council’s Gender Legitimacy:  The Symbolic Capital of 
Resolution 1325’ in Hilary Charlesworth and Jean Marc Coicard (eds), Faultlines of International 
Legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
8 Harold Koh, ‘Keynote Address:  The Obama Administration and International Law’(2010) 104 
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 207, 219.
9 See: Felicity Ruby, ‘Security Council Resolution 1325: A Tool for Conflict Prevention?’ in Gina 
Heathcote and Dianne Otto (eds), Rethinking Peacekeeping, Gender Perspectives and Collective Security 
(London: Pluto Press, 2013.)
10 For a definition and analysis of what constitutes the ‘mainstream’ of international law, see: 
B. S. Chimni, ‘A Prolegomena to a Class Approach to International Law’ (2010) 21 European Journal of 
International Law 57; also see B. S. Chimni, ‘An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International 
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requires acknowledgement.11 In addition, appreciation of non-Western feminist 
understandings of governance, of gender, and of insecurity are vital to challenging the 
limited perspectives and answers prevalent in mainstream international legal schol-
arship (MILS).12 I reflect on the feminist project within international law, its strengths 
and weaknesses, as well as an emergent division between contemporary Western fem-
inist approaches that have increasingly gained leverage at the UN and the spectrum 
of feminist thinking on the use of force.13 I conclude with a return to Shelly Wright’s 
article, ‘The Horizon of Becoming’,14 emphasizing the role that humanity plays as a 
persistent motif in feminist approaches, so that the prohibition on the use of force is 
articulated as a useful beginning for imagining the potential of humanity rather than, 
as international actors often assume, a starting point for justifying further force, further 
violence, or further destruction.
II. Women’s Participation: 
Organizational and  
Normative Approaches
In 1992 Chinkin noted the ‘invisibility of women in nationalists movements and their 
invisibility in determining the legality or otherwise of any international use of force’.15 
In 2011, as protest in the Middle East garnered global attention, the role of women 
Law’ (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of International Law 1 defining MILS as ‘an ensemble of methods, 
practices and understandings in relation to the identification, interpretation, and enforcement of 
enforcement of international law’ (at 2). Of the four features of MILS that Chimini identifies, per-
tinent to the analysis in this chapter, is that ‘practitioners of MILS do not recognise that there are 
structural constraints in the international system that greatly limit the pursuit of common good 
through law’ (ibid).
11 eg the four central pieces of Western scholarship on the use of force, despite being published after 
the first Security Council resolution on women, peace, and security, have no index reference to women or 
gender: Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense (5th edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011); Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); Mary Ellen O’Connell, International Law and the Use of Force:  Cases and Materials 
(New York: Federation Press, 2005). 12 See n 10.
13 See: Doris Buss, ‘The New Man of International Law’ in Amy Bartholomew (ed), Empire’s Law: The 
American Imperial Project and the ‘War to Remake the World’, (London: Pluto Press, 2006).
14 Wright, The Horizon of Becoming, 1.
15 Christine Chinkin, ‘A Gendered Perspective to the International Use of Force’ (1992) 12 Australian 
Yearbook of International Law 279, 280.
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in popular revolutions was given both media16 and academic attention.17 The topic of 
‘Women and the Arab Spring’ has attracted continuing global attention yet elections 
in Tunisia and Egypt demonstrate the difficulties of transforming women’s role in the 
articulation of dissatisfaction with the state into concrete political reform that is atten-
tive to gender equality. At the same time, women’s movements have struggled to chal-
lenge local perceptions that women’s rights are concepts that have been exported from 
the West and that should be rejected post-revolution.18 When force has been author-
ized, women’s rights have been deployed as rhetoric19 or in post-conflict resolutions 
but not as a component of the decision-making process with respect to the use of force. 
This is illustrated below in analysis of the 2011 Libyan intervention.
Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force to protect the 
Libyan people from state-led violence.20 Despite the authorization coming over a 
decade after the first Security Council resolution on women, peace, and security 
(Resolution 1325)  and four subsequent resolutions also emphasizing the need to 
consider women’s security and to incorporate women’s participation into all stages 
of the decision-making process, Resolution 1973 was silent on the normative and 
organizational requirements of Resolution 1325, in particular the need for women’s 
participation in the decision to authorize force. While the structure of the Security 
Council in 2011 included some high-profile women, notably Susan Rice represent-
ing the US, Maria Luiza Riberio Viotti representing Brazil, and Joy Ogwu represent-
ing Nigeria, these women were not charged with representing women’s interests. 
The presence of three women sitting on the Council when the decision was made 
to authorize force in Libya highlights the limitations of strategies centred on add-
ing women to existing institutions: as this does little to challenge the organization’s 
structure or the normative outputs of the institution.
It is not until after the Gaddafi regime had been deposed from power and the UN 
action in Libya shifts from the authorized use of force to post-conflict strategies for 
peacebuilding that women were recognized within the Council’s debates as partici-
pants and stakeholders within the security discourse. Security Council Resolution 
2009, issued seven months after Resolution 1973, established the United Nations 
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)21 and included a condemnation of sexual 




17 See eg Nadje Al-Ali, ‘Gendering the Arab Spring’ (2012) 5 Middle East Journal of Culture and 
Communication 26. 18 Al-Ali, ‘Gendering the Arab Spring’.
19 Starting just before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iraqi women were heralded by the US adminis-
tration as promoters of freedom and democracy, see <http://www.gwi-boell.de/web/un-resolutions- 
embedded-feminism-nadje-al-ali-2811.html> and contrast with <http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/rls/
rm/2003/18477.htm>.
20 SC Res 1973: UN SCOR 6598th mtg, S/RES/1973 (17 Mar 2011).
21 SC Res 2009 (16 Sept 2011).
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violence in its Preamble and a call for accountability for human rights violations, 
including sexual violence, as well as protection for vulnerable groups.22 The subse-
quent Security Council resolution on the situation in Libya, Resolution 2016, identi-
fied the participation of women (and minority groups) as a concern in its Preamble. 
Resolutions 2017 and 2022 on Libya made no mention of women or of the risk of 
gender-based violence during armed conflict.23 So it is in Resolution 2040, issued by 
the Security Council a year after the authorization of the use of force,24 where these 
strands are drawn together and the Council condemns sexual violence (of men, 
women, and children) in the Preamble, addresses issues of protection from and 
accountability for acts of sexual violence in operative paragraph 325 and encourages 
UNSMIL to promote ‘the empowerment and the political participation of women’,26 
as well as the need for the protection of women and children’s human rights.27 In 
March 2013, with the renewal of UNSMIL’s mandate by the Council, a similar set of 
concerns are articulated.28 The separation of the authorization of force from atten-
tion to women’s security is thus visible across this sequence of resolutions.
Consequently, the Security Council’s resolutions on Libya demonstrate the 
extent to which the agenda developed on women, peace, and security is devel-
oped away from decisions on the use of force. There is no attention to the women, 
peace, and security agenda in the decision to authorize force: this is not attended 
to by the Council until well into the post-conflict peacebuilding process (and after 
the creation of UNSMIL in Resolution 2009) and without consistency across the 
post-conflict initiatives. The approach to women, peace, and security in the Libya 
resolutions is developed without any requirement that the Council itself be atten-
tive to the participation of women in its own committees and decision-making 
structures. For example, in Resolution 1973 the Council also established a Panel 
of Experts, to monitor the situation in Libya, yet again ignored its own decree for 
women’s participation in decision-making structures at all levels.29 This indicates 
that the women, peace, and security agenda of the Council would be better under-
stood as a women and peace agenda that perpetuates an understanding that the 
‘hard work’ of security, or the decision to authorize the use of force, is inimical to 
the Council’s development of gender perspectives.
Furthermore, even when the Security Council addresses women’s participa-
tion in post-conflict communities, the focus is grounded within a liberal feminist 
model that is narrow in its focus on strategies to obtain women’s formal equality in 
22 SC Res 2009, operative para 7.
23 SC Res 2016: UN SCOR 6640th mtg, S/RES/2016 (27 Oct 2016); SC Res 2017: UN SCOR 6644th 
mtg, S/RES/2017 (31 Oct 2011); SC Res 2022: UN SCOR 6673rd mtg, S/RES/2022 (2 Dec 2012).
24 SC Res 2040: UN SCOR 6733rd mtg, S/RES/2040 (12 Mar 2012).
25 SC Res 2040, operative para 3. 26 SC Res 2040, operative para 6(a).
27 SC Res 2040, operative para 6(b).
28 SC Res 2095: UN SCOR 6934th mtg, S/RES/2095 (14 Mar 2013).
29 SC Res 2095., operative para 24.
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access to decision-making structures; often within a constricted set of substantive 
concerns that are indentified as of relevance to gender.30 As such, any call for the 
increased participation of women in the Council’s own decision-making structures, 
such as was hinted at earlier, should be not a quota-type strategy. The empirical 
aspect of the participation claim lies in the recognition of the relative absence of 
women in international and national decision-making structures, yet to address 
this absence the incorporation of women’s narratives from outside the mainstream 
of international law to explain, analyse, and challenge the international law on the 
use of force is necessary.
A structural bias strategy centred on women’s participation replaces demands for 
gender equality, in terms of women’s proportionate or numerical representation, 
with a sophisticated and long-term commitment to enhancing women’s capacity 
for participation in international and state structures, via attention to education, 
health, maternal support, and addressing restrictive social narratives on women’s 
roles within communities. This would involve seeking out women’s understanding 
of their own and society’s needs, as well as understanding the role of women on the 
‘peripheries’ in challenging social, cultural, and legal norms.31
Strategies that encourage women to value themselves, their opinions, and their 
capabilities, through education, through empowerment strategies, and through the 
challenging of gendered violence that is tolerated because it is directed against them 
as women, are the types of strategies that are relevant to enlarging women’s partici-
pation in institutional and state structures. This also involves thinking through the 
existing gender imbalances within powerful structures, including the Council, to 
ask how education of existing participants might assist recognition of how priv-
ilege perpetuates gendered harms. None of these structural bias reforms are cur-
rently apparent in the resolutions of the Council and without this level of gender 
reform the Council will continue to contribute to the lack of women’s participation 
in high-level decision-making structures.
For decision-making structures on the use of force, the disproportionately low 
representation of women (ie in the Security Council) is simple to acknowledge yet 
this does not mean that either proportionate representation would be the optimal 
outcome (although it might be a start) or that women do not already work in a 
multitude of positions that support the work of the Council and remain unrec-
ognized in terms of the formal participants and decision-makers in the Council. 
The democratic deficit in the make-up of Security Council is easy to identify, more 
difficult to reform. While the Council is a political body with legal powers that 
might not be expected to reflect global diversity, the shifts since the early 1990s to 
expand the range of resolutions the Council issues, including thematic resolutions 
30 Gina Heathcote, The Law on the Use of Force: A Feminist Analysis (London: Routledge, 2012), ch 6.
31 Ratna Kapur, Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of Postcolonialism (New York: Routledge, 
2005), ch 4.
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such as those on women, peace, and security, has considerably altered the nature 
of the Security Council output. The creation of normative frameworks consider-
ably expands the Council’s powers and demonstrates a need for a representative 
Council. In addition, greater regional representation is now an established norm of 
the Council demonstrating that transformation is possible.
To propose women’s full participation in legal processes is, therefore, to embark 
on a (slow) reworking of legal structures and normative categories, including 
the Security Council itself. The organization of Council is this way linked to the 
normative outputs of the Council, with a beginning point being attention to the 
maintenance of gender imbalances in the Council’s own structure. Consequently, 
when authorizations of force are made, such as in response to the crisis in Libya in 
2011, without attention to the impact of force on women or to the gender structures 
military force functions within, the Council remains complicit in the undermining 
of women’s security. When justifications for the use of force, or authorizations from 
the Security Council, are articulated and maintained/extended through a narrowly 
selected group of elite men, with occasional representations from elite women, 
women’s participation—and specifically feminist concerns regarding the deploy-
ment of force—remain outside our understandings of the prohibition.
III. The Misrepresentation of Western 
Feminism as a Universal Feminism
Orford’s seminal text, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use 
of Force in International Law draws on critical legal theory, Third World Approaches 
to International Law (TWAIL),32 feminist and postcolonial theory to demonstrate a 
core feature of feminist approaches to international law that has resonance for the 
law on the use of force: feminist thinking is immersed in debates and dialogues with 
a range of other contemporary theoretical approaches that both inform and spring-
board from feminist thinking. As such, recognition and understanding of the inter-
section between race and gender needs to be adequately integrated to the feminist 
reappraisal of women’s participation within decision-making structures, so that this 
can be acknowledged and developed within approaches to the prohibition on the 
use of force. The intersection of race and gender are extensively theorized in fem-
inist and critical approaches, yet overlooked at the institutional level, in particular 
32 For an introduction see: Antony Anghie, B. S Chimni, Karin Mickelson, and Obiora Okafor (eds), 
The Third World and the International Order (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003).
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Security Council work on women, peace, and security. For Wright (writing in the 
context of international human rights law) this requires open engagement with the 
legacy and reach of decolonization, such that she proclaims:
I would suggest that decolonisation is an immensely more complex process than inter-
national law has hitherto acknowledged. It involves seriously questioning the meaning of 
universality and its association with European humanism.33
To take Wright’s project seriously is, therefore, to openly question and acknowledge 
the racial and gendered power imbalances that are at once invisible and visible in 
international relations. These imbalances are often unconsciously propagated in 
mainstream understandings of the prohibition on the use of force that prioritize 
justified and authorized violence.34 This also requires reflection on Wright’s quest 
for expanding our understanding of what it means to be human, acknowledging the 
limited frameworks dominant political, moral, and philosophical models were born 
from, in particular the gender and racial exclusions that created the conditions for 
Enlightenment thinking that continues to influence the structures of international 
law today.
Recognition of the embedded dialogues of feminist approaches allows for greater rec-
ognition of the transnational and anti-imperialist dimensions of feminist methods. This 
also demonstrates the narrow focus of specific institutional, and some Western, 
feminist dialogues (particularly those that have been developed within the Security 
Council’s women, peace, and security framework) that often fail to reflect, develop, 
or integrate the established links between feminist and other critical approaches. 
Orford, writing in 2003, was able to fuse the strengths of TWAIL, postcolonial, 
and critical legal scholarship with a feminist appraisal of the narratives produced 
to underpin and justify humanitarian interventions at the onset of the new millen-
nium, compelling readers to work against ‘forgetting law’s imperial history’35 and 
thus allowing the text to explore the limits of gender as a mechanism for analysis 
when used in isolation from other critical models.36 This permits Orford to recog-
nize the role that the prohibition on the use of force plays in reasserting the status 
quo of international law while permitting powerful states to intervene in extreme 
circumstances.
The post-millennium use of force through targeted strikes starkly demonstrates 
this need for a diversity of feminist and critical thinking to be developed within 
approaches to the prohibition on the use of force. Within the women, peace, and 
security framework, akin to the work of the Security Council more generally, tar-
geted strikes are not broached. Justifications for the use of targeted strikes on the 
territory of another state, by the US, relies upon consent of the state where the 
33 Wright, International Human Rights, Decolonisation and Globalisation, 10.
34 Heathcote, The Law on the Use of Force.
35 Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, 39.
36 Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, 39.
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force occurs or the failure of the territorial state to implement Security Council 
targeted sanctions to establish the legality of the strikes.37 Regardless of whether 
these justifications are representative of international law, the parallel development 
of a targeted sanctions regime within the women, peace, and security framework 
seemingly provide a feminist endorsement of both the Council’s targeted sanctions 
regime and the Council’s silence on the legality of targeted strikes. Yet a feminist 
analysis of the targeted strikes conducted by the US on the territory of other states 
would focus precisely on the intersectional harm these attacks produce, including 
the creation of two tiers of rules on the use of force, the lack of protection for civil-
ians from targeted strikes, and the disproportionate risks to foreign communities as 
opposed to drone operators in the US.
In addition, the use of targeted strikes by the US has occurred in parallel with the 
US and the UK’s shift on the women, peace, and security framework from the gen-
eral Security Council Resolution 1325 to the production, under the US presidency 
of the Council, of four resolutions on women, peace, and security that centre pri-
marily on sexual violence during armed conflict. An intersectional feminist analysis 
raises questions of how both race and gender are constructed in these two moves 
by the US in relation to security in the post-millennium period. That is, the period 
where the US developed the technology to use force on the territory of another state 
without deploying troops to the location of force, has coincided with the period 
where vast discussion of the dangers of sexual violence during armed conflict has 
emerged and been led by the US in the Security Council. This allows a form of 
‘civi lized’ force to be conducted by the US through targeted strikes, not only with 
low risks to US actors but with low risks of sexual violence to foreign women (at 
least from US service personnel). As such, the atrocities of militaries in relation to 
the perpetration of sexual violence are documented and recorded to demonstrate 
the non-civilized nature of other forms of warfare and distinguished from the man-
ner in which the US conducts conflicts. A narrative of technologically advanced, 
precise, and ‘safe’ warfare conducted by the US is juxtaposed with the brutal stories 
of conflict documented in the global south. The complicity of Western militaries 
in the production of negative sexual cultures and sexual crimes is thus rendered 
less visible while new forms of forceful intervention are proposed as less damaging 
forms of warfare, justified through the exceptionalism of the global war on terror.
While feminist scholarship directly addressing the prohibition on the use of force 
may be less in comparison to the mainstream material available on the use of force, 
the complexity of a feminist approach to the prohibition on the use of force—if 
embedded in larger critical dialogues on race and global privilege—speaks to con-
temporary conditions in global relations and demands a remembrance of being 
human, as articulated by Wright. Becoming human requires we re-imagine and 
redevelop the boundaries of our thinking, recalling the essence of the prohibition 
37 Koh, ‘Keynote Address’.
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as a restraint on force rather than a space to argue for further force, justified, authorized, 
or legitimized.
In relation to targeted strikes, this raises new questions about the perpetuation of 
imperial structures as civilized and uncivilized that, not surprisingly, co-opt ideas 
about women’s protection, particularly the protection of foreign (non-Western) 
women from non-Western men, which ignore the global prevalence of gendered 
violence and the manner in which women’s rights are deployed to construct stand-
ards that reinforce a model of the West as technologically advanced and civilized. 
Targeted strikes kill men and women producing local narratives that are harmful 
to the protection of women’s rights due to the anti-US sentiment that emerges in 
the locations of targeted strikes. This often becomes a suspicion of other forms of 
‘Western’ interventions of which feminist action is often included. As such, the 
combination of the Council’s own women, peace, and security agenda and the fail-
ure of the Council to address or regulate the practice of targeted strikes, as well 
as the implicit endorsement of targeted strikes via the targeted sanctions regime, 
including targeted sanctions against perpetrators of sexual violence in armed con-
flict, re-appropriates feminist thinking as a Western theory, when it is not. This 
contributes not only to global inequalities, but also to the articulation of important 
local feminist concerns and women’s rights generally, in spaces where anti-US senti-
ments arise in response to the risk of targeted strikes, as dangerous.
Consequently there is a need for both targeted strikes and targeted sanctions, 
including those against actors suspected of being responsible for widespread and 
systematic sexual violence, to be understood from diverse feminist perspectives and 
from larger critical writing on international law to expose the power relations that 
embed rather than dismantle gender, race, and economic privilege.
IV. The Enduring Relevance of  
Feminist Peace Studies
The failure to engage effectively with feminist peace studies within the Security 
Council’s women, peace, and security framework has been matched with a failure to 
engage the prohibition on the use of force as a gendered component of international 
relations.38 As such, in recalling feminist peace activism, for example the work of the 
38 eg see Fionnula Ni Aoláin, Dina Francesca Haynes, and Naomi Cahn, On the Frontlines: Gender, 
War and the Post Conflict Process (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) which focuses on post-conflict 
processes.
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Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom in the creation of the League 
and the UN,39 the simplicity of Article 2(4) is challenged and a quest for the devel-
opment of the prohibition in response to contemporary understandings of the nexus 
between global inequalities, gendered understandings of violence, and the diversity of 
feminist approaches needs to be developed.
I have argued elsewhere that a failure to develop the legal finesse of Article 2(4) as 
a prohibition on the use of force is linked with histories of international institutions, 
such as the UN and the League of Nations, that leave off recognition of the role of fem-
inist peace activism.40 In turn, this leads to the preoccupation of states and scholars 
with the articulation of justifications, rather than the prohibition on the use of force. 
This constructs a status quo that contributes to, rather than diminishes, the level of 
conflict globally.
The placement of Article 2(4) as the epitome of state agreement on the nature of 
prohibited force was a significant legal development in 1945:  the failure of states to 
continue to develop the legal reach of the prohibition does not mean this must always 
be the case. From a feminist perspective, Article 2(4) must be regarded as the begin-
ning of the outlawing of state violence, so that the elaboration and development of 
what it means to have a prohibition on the use of force, its limits, its regulation, and its 
co-option into a gendered understanding of law and violence is connected to global 
feminist peace activism. Unfortunately, feminist peace activism remains a footnote, 
a sign, or completely invisible rather than a site of analytical and practical inquiry 
within MILS.
Within the Security Council’s women, peace, and security resolutions, the possi-
bility of force as a mechanism to halt widespread and systematic sexual violence is 
proposed in operative paragraph 1 of Resolutions 1820, 1888, and 1960.41 This is mark-
edly different from a feminist politics of peace, which emphasizes the need to work 
to prevent conflict through attention to social and economic inequalities both within 
and across states. Nor does the policy of taking ‘necessary measures’, via the Security 
Council as operative paragraph 1 of these resolutions proposes, work to challenge exist-
ing insecurities, the role of social and cultural constructions of gender, the persistence 
of gender-based violence within communities, or the need for disarmament rather 
than deployment of weapons into conflict zones. Like all of the resolutions on women, 
peace, and security, the provisions imagining the use of force to stop systematic and 
39 Lela B.  Costin, ‘Feminism, Pacificism, Internationalism and the 1915 International Congress 
of Women’ (1982) 5 Women’s Studies International Forum 301; Anne Wiltsher, Most Dangerous 
Women: Feminist Peace Campaigners of the Great War (London: Pandora, 1985); Leila Rupp, Worlds 
of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1997).
40 Heathcote, The Law on the Use of Force.
41 See further: Gina Heathcote, ‘Feminist Politics and the Use of Force: Theorising Feminist Action 
and Security Council Resolution 1325’ (2011) 7 Socio-Legal Review 23–43; Letita Anderson, ‘Politics 
by Other Means: When Does Sexual Violence Threaten International Peace and Security?’ (2010) 17 
International Peacekeeping 244.
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widespread sexual violence in armed conflict construct responses to violence rather 
than working to stop it occurring in the first place.
The 2009 General Assembly debates on the Responsibility to Protect42 demon-
strate how, outside powerful Western states, support for increased interventions, 
authorized or otherwise, is low. In contrast, states in conflict zones recognize the 
strength of the first pillar of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine: the Responsibility 
to Prevent. This further indicates the complexity of harnessing the plural perspec-
tives on the use of force that exist globally. That this is difficult, complex, and 
undoubtedly time-consuming is no reason to avoid commencing such a project.
Feminist perspectives that acknowledge peace activism as a vital voice within 
global feminism challenge our communities to continue to return to the prohib-
ition, allowing those who have experienced the impact of force to contribute to the 
future refinement and application of the prohibition. It is, however, important to 
note that feminist peace activism is not a movement that is premised on women 
as peacemakers:  such an approach would get us no further than the attempts to 
add women in political structures, discussed earlier, as this relies on stereotypes of 
femininity that feminist projects work towards disrupting. Feminist peace activism 
is, instead, a method and a means for speaking about peace through disarmament, 
through attention to the continuum of violence from the intimate to the inter-
national, and through identifying the persistence of gender-based violence in 
communities defined as peaceful and in those enduring conflict.
The endorsement of the Definition of Aggression43 within the Crime of Aggression 
by the State Parties to the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court in 
2010 illustrates the difficulties of any attempt to build state consensus on force and 
aggression. At the same time, the agreement by the state parties to the Rome Statute 
in Kampala in 2010, and the slow shift towards establishing individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of aggression, do demonstrate the possibilities that law 
offers.44 Yet, international criminal law is reactive; in this sense, it cannot stop the 
use of force although it may, in the future, punish those who instigate force. As such, 
it is also time to initiate refinement and development of the prohibition on the use 
of force. Return to the prohibition requires acknowledgement of those who were 
excluded during international law’s formation and from the expression of global 
values in the early years of the UN. As it is no longer possible to proclaim the inher-
ent universality of a system that overtly excluded on the grounds of gender and eth-
nicity, strategies for inclusive and pluralist future outcomes need to be incorporated 
42 Transcript of the 63rd session of the UN General Assembly, 97th–101st Plenary Meeting, 21–28 
July 2009, available at <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/articl
e/35-r2pcs-topics/2493-general-assembly-debate-on-the-responsibility-to-protect-and-informal-inte
ractive-dialogue-#debate>.
43 GA Res 3314 (XXIX) UN GAOR, 29th Sess, Supp No 31 (14 Dec 1974).
44 For International Criminal Court developments with respect to the Crime of Aggression, see 
<http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression>.
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from this stage forward: as a global community we are well past discussing whether 
this is necessary.
Incorporating the participation of women and non-Western actors, with cross- 
class and cross-cultural perspectives to develop and extend the prohibition on the 
use of force is not a short-term project; however, few of the projects international 
law has embarked upon have been short term. If, as MILS tells us, international 
law began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia and the writings of the father of 
international law, Hugo Grotius, then tri-millennium recognition of the very lim-
ited perspective this model affords our understandings of international law are long 
overdue. The transfer of this recognition into challenging our accepted ways of act-
ing is the next stage. To address the diversity of perspectives that feminist approaches 
bring to future debates needs to commence with attention to existing gender imbal-
ances, which were discussed earlier. This is a project that equally requires attention 
as to who is permitted to speak on women’s issues within international law and who 
is empowered within our communities to speak to power.
My recommendation, to develop the parameters of Article 2(4), is in contrast to 
the increasing emphasis placed on justifications and is voiced in the context of the 
previous recommendations regarding women’s participation and agency. To develop 
Article 2(4) would require recognition of the inadequacy of the prohibition because 
it has been consistently read as accommodating justifications for violence rather 
than as a reason for state restraint. Development of the prohibition requires strate-
gies that seek to disassociate constructions of the nation-state under international 
law from understandings of the Western-sexed legal subject.45 Consequently, what 
begins as a strategy ‘within’ the contemporary contours of international law also 
requires a larger feminist project of re-imagining the basic norms and values that 
shape international law. Underlying this claim is an expectation that a renewed focus 
on the prohibition encourages peacebuilding initiatives and preventative strategies.
V. Conclusion
In her article on the 11 September 2011 attacks on the US, Wright argues, ‘inter-
national law might be positively transformed if it were to take the critical approaches 
of feminist and other scholars seriously.’46 This recalls Chinkin’s approach in 1992 
when a structural bias feminism, that recognized the harm and inequalities that 
women live with, globally, and the foundational bias of international law, was 
45 See further: Heathcote, The Law on the Use of Force, 9–10.
46 Wright, The Horizon of Becoming, 216.
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perceived as the path for the development of feminist perspectives. The Security 
Council has elaborated an agenda on women, peace, and security that downplays, 
and at times renders invisible, the diversity of these feminist approaches to law. The 
consequence is a failure of international institutions to see the prohibition on the 
use of force as a starting point for a transformative approach to the foundations of 
international law: indeed, military force is embedded within the women, peace, and 
security resolutions as a potential mechanism for halting widespread and system-
atic sexual violence despite the history of feminist scholarship highlighting the need 
for preventative strategies, the social and cultural causes of violence against women, 
and the role military force plays in perpetuating negative gender relations that cre-
ate risks to women within communities.
Additionally, the failure to develop the spectrum of feminist perspectives within 
security documents and debates can be linked to the failure to regard the imperial 
history of international law, and the persistent inequalities both across and within 
communities, as contributing to the normative contours of debates on the use of 
force. A strategy of understanding the prohibition as a component of ‘becoming 
human’, rather than an endpoint in our debates on force, requires attention to the 
range of structural biases within international structures: gender, race, economic. 
Seeing the prohibition on the use of force as a foundational law that lacks sufficient 
interrogation and development is a first step in moving away from debates on when 
force should be deployed towards understanding that force is prohibited.
The prohibition on the use of force is the lynchpin of the international relation-
ship between law and violence. Feminist scholarship demonstrates the co-option of 
gendered assumptions into the law and violence relationship47 that emerges in the 
legal enforcement of public and private violence,48 state and individual violence.49 
To reconsider the prohibition, to develop its reach and purpose, to talk seriously 
about what it means to prohibit the use of force, is a relevant starting point for the 
next generations of feminist scholars writing international law. The approach I have 
outlined in this chapter begins with attention to the persistent gender imbalances 
in institutional structures at all levels, reconsiders the contemporary approach to 
combating sexual violence in armed conflict to remove the nexus with force, and 
returns to the diversity of feminist approaches that demonstrate the intersectional-
ity of discriminations and that recall the history and concerns of feminist peace 
activism. This is also a timely project for international lawyers who seek to better 
incorporate global understandings of the law on the use of force that are sensitive to 
the persistence of gender inequalities.
47 Lucinda Joy Peach in Jennifer Rycenga and Marguerite Waller (eds), Frontline Feminisms: Women, 
War and Resistance (London: Routledge, 2001).
48 Cynthia Cockburn and Dubravka Zarkov (eds), The Postwar Moment: Militaries, Masculinities 
and International Peacekeeping (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2002).
49 Caroline Moser and Fiona Clark, Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and 
Political Violence (London: Zed Books, 2001).
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